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Bounds for the computational complexity of major justification
logics were found in papers by Buss, N. Krupski, Kuznets, and Mil-
nikel: logics J, J4, JT, LP and JD, were established to be Σp
2
-complete.
A corresponding lower bound is also known for JD4, the system that
includes the consistency axiom and positive introspection. However,
no upper bound has been established so far for this logic. Here, the
missing upper bound for the complexity of JD4 is established through
an alternating algorithm. It is shown that using Fitting models of
only two worlds is adequate to describe JD4; this helps to produce an
effective tableau procedure and essentially is what distinguishes the
new algorithm from existing ones.
1 Introduction
The classical analysis of knowledge includes the notion of justification,
e.g., the famous tripartate view of knowledge as justified, true belief, usually
attributed to Plato. Hintikka’s modal logic approach represents knowledge
as true belief. Justification logic extends epistemic logic by supplying the
missing third component of Plato’s characterization.
The Logic of Proofs LP was the first justification logic to be introduced,
by Artemov, in [1, 2] (see also [3]). Later, variations appeared in [5] corre-
sponding to well-known normal modal logics. Two types of semantics are
known for justification logics: M-models, introduced by Mkrtychev ([12, 17])
and F-models, introduced by Fitting ([4, 8, 9, 14, 18]). F-models resemble
Kripke models for normal modal logics equipped with an additional mech-
anism, the admissible evidence function, usually represented by A. For a
term t and formula φ, A(t, φ) will be the set of worlds in the model where
t is appropriate evidence for φ. t : φ is true in a world iff φ is true in every
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accessible world and the world in question is in A(t, φ). M-models are essen-
tially F-models of only one world. In this setting A(t, φ) will be either true
or false.
Upper and lower bounds are known for the computational complexity of
justification logics J, J4, JT, LP and JD, and determine them to be Σp
2
-
complete ([6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16]). In [15], Kuznets presents a new algorithm
for checking JD-satisfiability. This algorithm is in many perspectives similar
to the ones for other justification mentioned here: J, J4, JT, LP. A tableau
method is used to non-deterministically construct a model that satisfies the
formula in question, then the algorithm checks whether the produced condi-
tions for the admissible evidence function are legitimate. This last check is
known to be in NP ([10, 13]) and is, in fact, NP-complete ([7]). Therefore, the
resulting overall algorithm is a polynomial time alternating algorithm with
one alternation, starting from a universal state and eventually reaching an
existential state1, which establishes that the problem is in Πp
2
and therefore
the logic is in Σp
2
.
The difference among the cases that have been dealt with previously
lies in the consistent evidence property of logics JD and JD4 (the “D”); in
an M-model of these logics, we can never have A(t,⊥). In other words,
if t1 : φ1, . . . , tn : φn are satisfied in a model, the set {φ1, . . . , φn} must be
consistent. To incorporate this condition, the algorithm continues and tries
to verify whether this set, {φ1, . . . , φn}, is satisfiable in another model with
another tableau construction. This is done by utilizing additional numerical
prefixes on the prefixed formulas. A sequence of models is thus produced.
Although this construction, like all previous ones, is based on the compact
character of M-models for justification logics, it produces something that re-
sembles something very similar to an F-model. In general, when discussing
complexity issues for justification logics, working with F-models appears in-
convenient and unnecessary: many possible worlds could succeed a current
world. Furthermore, the admissible evidence function is defined on this mul-
titude of worlds, making it virtually prohibitive to use this setting to discuss
complexity issues. On the other hand, M-models consist of only one world.
The admissible evidence function is by far less complicated and the condi-
tions it should satisfy can be checked by an NP-algorithm, except in the
case of JD and JD4. For these logics, the additional condition that for any
justification term t, A(t,⊥) = false cannot be verified as easily due to the
negative nature of this condition. It would be nice to be able to sacrifice
some, but not much, of the compact description of M-models for more con-
venient conditions on A and indeed, it seems that in the case of JD, this is
1Or, this can be viewed as a coNP algorithm using an oracle from NP.
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exactly what can be done to provide a solution. Now, this idea will be taken
a small step forward to provide a similar Σ2 algorithm for JD4-satisfiability.
Additionally, the positive introspection axiom of JD4 will help provide an
even simpler class of models than in the case of JD, making the study of its
complexity easier. Specifically, it is discovered that using Fitting-like models
of only two worlds is adequate to describe JD4.
2 The logic JD4
JD4 was first introduced in [5] as a variation of LP, the Logic of Proofs. It
is the explicit counterpart of D4, both in intuition, as there is some similarity
their axioms, and in a more precise way (see [5]).
The language will include justification constants ci, i ∈ N, justification
variables: xi, i ∈ N and justification terms, usually denoted t, s, . . .. These
are defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Justification Terms).
• Constants (ci, i ∈ N) and variables (xi, i ∈ N) are terms;
• If t1, t2 are terms, so are
(t1 · t2), (t1 + t2), (!t1).
“·” is usually called application, “+” is called sum, and “!” proof checker.
The set of justification terms will be called Tm.
Also, propositional variables will be used in the language: pi, i ∈ N.
The set of propositional variables will be called SLet. The formulas of the
language are
Definition 2 (Justification Formulas).
• All propositional variables (pi, i ∈ N) are formulas
• If p is a propositional variable, t is a term and φ, ψ are formulas, then
so are
p, ⊥, (φ→ ψ), (t :φ)
¬φ can be seen as short for φ → ⊥, and the rest of the connectives can
be defined from these in the usual way. Also as usual, parentheses will be
omitted using standard conventions, and naturally, !s : s : φ will be read as
(!s : (s :φ)). Fm will denote the set of justification formulas.
The axioms of JD4∅ are the following.
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A1 Finitely many schemes of classical propositional logic;
A2 s : (φ→ ψ) → (t :φ→ (s · t) :ψ) - Application Axiom;
A3
s :φ→ (s+ t) :φ
s :φ→ (t+ s) :φ - Monotonicity Axiom;
A5 t :φ→!t : t :φ - Positive introspection;
A6 t :⊥ → ⊥ - Consistency Axiom
and Modus Ponens.




Definition 3. A constant specification for a justification logic JL is any set
CS ⊆ {c :A | c is a constant, A an axiom of JL}.
A c.s. is axiomatically appropriate if each axiom is justified by at least one
constant, schematic if every constant justifies a certain number of axiom
schemes (0 or more), and schematically injective if it is schematic and every
constant justifies at most one scheme.
Definition 4. Given a constant specification CS for JD4, the logic JD4CS is
JD4∅, with the additional rule
c :A
R4CS
where c :A ∈ CS.
A definition of the (Fitting) semantics for JD4CS follows.
Definition 5 ([4, 8, 9, 14, 18]). An F-model M for JD4CS is a quadruple
(W,R, V,A), where W 6= ∅ is the set of worlds (or states) of the model, R
is a transitive and serial (for any a ∈ W there is some b ∈ W such that
aRb) binary relation on W , V assigns a subset of W to each propositional
variable, p, and A assigns a subset of W to each pair of a justification term
and a formula. Additionally, A must satisfy the following conditions:
• Application closure: for any formulas φ, ψ and justification terms t, s,
A(s, φ→ ψ) ∩ A(t, φ) ⊆ A(s · t, ψ).
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• Sum closure: for any formula φ and justification terms t, s,
A(t, φ) ∪ A(s, φ) ⊆ A(t+ s, φ).
• Simplified CS-closure: for any axiom A, constant c, such that c :A ∈
CS,
A(c, A) = W.
• Positive introspection closure: for any formula φ and justification term
t,
A(t, φ) ⊆ A(!t, t :φ).
• Monotonicity: for any formula φ, justification term t and a, b ∈ W , if
aRb and a ∈ A(t, φ), then b ∈ A(t, φ).
Truth in the model is defined in the following way, given a state a:
• M,a 6|= ⊥.
• If p is a propositional variable, then M, a |= p iff a ∈ V (p)
• If φ, ψ are formulas, then M, a |= φ → ψ if and only if M,a |= ψ, or
M, a 6|= φ.
• If φ is a formula and t a term, then M, a |= t : φ if and only if a ∈
A(t, φ) and for all b ∈ W , if aRb, then M, b |= φ.
JD4CS is sound and complete w.r.t. its F-models, for an axiomatically appro-
priate constant specification. Additionally, it is complete w.r.t. its F-models
that satisfy the following property.
Strong Evidence Property: M, a |= t :φ if and only if a ∈ A(t, φ).
It is also useful to present Mkrtychev (M-) models for JD4. M-models are
F-models with just one world. However, since if we insisted on seriality, we
would introduce factivity (t :φ→ φ would be valid), this condition is replaced
by another, the consistent evidence condition (in the definition below).
Definition 6 ([12, 17]). An M-model for JD4CS , where CS is a constant
specification for JD4 is a pair
M = (V,A),
where propositional valuation
V : SLet −→ {true, false}
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assigns a truth value to each propositional variable and
A : Tm× Fm −→ {true, false}
is an admissible evidence function. A(t, φ) will be used as an abbreviation
for A(t, φ) = true and ¬A(t, φ) as an abbreviation for A(t, φ) = false.
The admissible evidence function must satisfy certain closure conditions:
Application Closure: If A(s, φ→ ψ) and A(t, φ) then A(s · t, ψ).
Sum Closure: If A(s, φ) then A(s+ t, φ).
If A(t, φ) then A(s+ t, φ).
Simplified CS Closure: If c :A ∈ CS, then A(c, A).
Positive Introspection Closure If A(t, φ) then A(!t, t :φ)
Consistent Evidence Condition A(t,⊥) = false,
for any formulas φ, ψ, any terms s, t, any c :A ∈ CS, and any integer n ≥ 1.
The truth relation M |= H is defined as follows:
• M |= p iff V (p) = true
• M 6|= ⊥
• M |= φ→ ψ iff M 6|= φ or M |= ψ
• M |= t :φ iff A(t, φ)
for any formulas φ, ψ, any term t and any propositional variable p.
JD4CS is sound and complete with respect to its M-models.
The following definition will prove useful later on.
Definition 7. Given an F-model M, a world w of the model and a formula
t :φ, we say that t :φ is factive at world w of M, if and only if M, w |= t :
φ −→ φ. Similarly, we can define when t :φ is factive in an M-model. A set
Φ of formulas of the form t :φ will be factive exactly when all elements of Φ
are factive.
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3 ∗-calculus and minimal evidence functions
In this section, the ∗-calculus is defined. The ∗-calculus provides an
independent axiomatization of the reflected fragments of justification logics
and is an invaluable tool in the study of the complexity of these logics. The
concepts, notation and results in this section come from [11, 13, 17].
Definition 8 (Star-expressions). If t is a term and φ is a formula, then
∗(t, φ) is a star-expression (∗-expression).
Definition 9. For any justification logic L and constant specification CS,
the reflected fragment of LCS is
rLCS = {t :φ | LCS ⊢ t :φ}.
Definition 10 (∗-calculus). ∗CS Axioms: ∗(c, A), where c :A ∈ CS.
∗A2
∗(s, φ→ ψ) ∗(t, φ)









The calculus: The ∗!CS-calculus is a calculus on starred expressions and
includes ∗CS, A2, A3 and A4.
Theorem 1 ([10, 13]). For any constant specification CS,
rJD4CS ⊢ t :φ ⇐⇒ rJD4CS ⊢ t :φ ⇐⇒ ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, φ).
Possible evidence functions are presented next, together with a way to
produce a minimal evidence function for an M-model.
Definition 11. An M-type possible evidence function is any function
B : Tm× Fm −→ {true, false}.
A possible evidence function is essentially an admissible evidence function
with no conditions imposed on it.
7
Definition 12. We say that an M-type possible evidence function B2 is based
on an M-type possible evidence function B1 and write
B1 ⊆ B2,
if for all terms t and formulas φ,
B1(t, φ) =⇒ B2(t, φ).
Definition 13. Let EF be a class of M-type possible evidence functions. A
possible evidence function B ∈ EF is called the minimal evidence function in
EF if for all B′ ∈ EF ,
B ⊆ B′.
Definition 14. For some possible evidence function B, B∗ = {∗(t, φ)|B(t, φ) =
true}.
Theorem 2 ([17]). For any CS constant specification for JD4 and any pos-
sible evidence function B, the class of M-type admissible evidence functions
for JD4CS based on B is symbolized AEFB(JD4CS), and if nonempty has a
unique minimal element A, which is the following:
A(t, φ) ⇐⇒ B∗ ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, φ).
Note. In the following, an F-type admissible evidence function when consid-
ering a single world of the model may be treated as an M-type admissible
evidence function, when the appropriate conditions are met. Despite changes
in notation, under certain circumstances this is entirely acceptable and in fact
this change in perspective will be very useful and frequent. Finally, it is use-
ful, given an F-type admissible evidence function A and a world u, to define
Au to be the set {(t, φ)|u ∈ A(t, φ)}.
Finally, since we are discussing complexity issues, it is natural that the
following theorem is relevant. In fact, it will prove to be extremely useful
later on.
Theorem 3 ([10, 13]). Let CS be a schematic constant specification decidable
in polynomial time. Then, there exists a non-deterministic algorithm that
runs in polynomial time and determines, given a finite set S of ∗-expressions,
a formula φ and a term t, whether
S ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, φ).
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4 A class of models
In the following, the constant specification CS will be assumed to be
axiomatically appropriate and, when discussing complexity issues, efficiently
decidable. The algorithm that will be presented and its correctness will be
based on the following proposition.
Proposition 4. A formula φ is JD4CS-satisfiable if and only if it is satis-
fiable by an F-model M = (W,R, V,A) for JD4CS that additionally has the
following properties:
• W has exactly two elements, a, b.
• R = {(a, b), (b, b)}.
Proof. Let φ be a formula that is JD4CS-satisfiable and let M
∗ = (W,R, V,A)
be a model and a ∈ W a world of the model that satisfies φ. Assume that
M∗ satisfies the Strong Evidence Property.
We know that R is serial and transitive and that A satisfies the mono-
tonicity property. From this, we know that there is an infinite sequence of
elements of W , α = (ai)i∈N, such that a0 = a, i < j ⇒ aiRaj & Aai ⊆ Aaj .
For any t :F , there is at most one j ∈ N, M∗, aj 6|= t :F → F . Otherwise,
there are i < j s.t. M∗, ai, aj 6|= t :F → F . Since M
∗, ai 6|= t :F → F , we
have M∗, ai |= t :F . From this, it follows that M
∗, aj |= F , so M
∗, aj |= t :
F → F - a contradiction.
Therefore, for any set of term-prefixed formulas, there is an i, after which
all terms of α are factive with respect to that set. More specifically, let Φ be
the set of term-prefixed subformulas of φ and let b be a term of α, where Φ
is factive.
Define M to be the model ({a, b}, {(a, b), (b, b)}, V ′,A′), such that V ′,A′
agree with V,A on a, b. That is, for any w ∈ {a, b}, t term, ψ formula, p
propositional variable, w ∈ V (p) if and only if w ∈ V ′(p), and w ∈ A(t, ψ)
if and only if w ∈ A′(t, ψ). It is easy to see that the new model satisfies the
conditions required of F-models for JD4CS
2.
By induction on the structure of χ, we can show that for any χ, subfor-
mula of φ, M∗, b |= χ iff M, b |= χ (and the propositional cases are trivial,
so). If χ = t : ω, then M∗, b |= χ iff M∗, b |= t : ω iff M∗, b |= ω and
b ∈ A(t, ω) (Strong Evidence) iff M, b |= ω and b ∈ A′(t, ω) iff M, b |= χ.
2Of course, we assume here that a 6= b, but this is a legitimate assumption. If we
need to make this explicit, we could simply have W = {(a, 0), (b, 1)} and the accessibility
relation, V ′, A′ behave in the same way.
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To prove that M, a |= φ, we will first prove that
M∗, a |= ψ ⇔ M, a |= ψ,
for any ψ subformula of φ, by induction on the structure of ψ. If ψ is a
propositional variable, and for the propositional cases, again, this is obvious
and the only interesting case is when ψ = t :χ. In this case, M∗, a |= t :χ iff
a ∈ A(t, χ) and M∗, b |= χ iff a ∈ A′(t, χ) and M, b |= χ iff M, a |= t :χ.
Observation 1. Note that we can now replace the admissible evidence func-
tion with another, say Am, such that w ∈ Am(t, ψ) iffM, w |= t :ψ. This new
function will satisfy the necessary conditions to be an admissible evidence
function and the new model will satisfy the same formulas as the old one in
the same worlds. Therefore, we can claim the following corollary.
Corollary 5. A formula is JD4CS-satisfiable if and only if it is satisfiable by
an F-model M = (W,R, V,A) for JD4CS that additionally has the following
properties:
• W has exactly two elements, a, b;
• R = {(a, b), (b, b)};
• a ∈ A(t, F ) if and only if M, a |= t :F for all t :F . (Strong Evidence
Condition)
5 The algorithm and its analysis
Neither the algorithm that determines JD4CS-satisfiability nor its analysis
is particularly novel (c.f. [12, 13, 15]). It is in fact based on the ones already
used to establish the same upper bound for the satisfiability for J, J4, JT, LP,
except for certain differences that stem from the fact that we are discussing a
different logic and thus the algorithm is based on a different class of models.
It is based on a tableau construction.
Prefixed expressions will be used and there will be two types of prefixes
and two types of expressions. The first will be the usual T or F prefix and the
other will be the prefix that will intuitively denote the world we are referring
to; these are a and b. So, the prefixed formulas will be of the form w P e,
where w ∈ {a, b}, P ∈ {T, F} and e is either a formula of the language or a
∗-expression. w will be called the world prefix and P the truth prefix.
As was mentioned previously, the algorithm will be based on a tableau
construction. The propositional tableau rules will be the ones usually used
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and they are not mentioned here. The non-propositional cases are covered
by the following rules.
a T s :ψ
a T ∗ (s, ψ)
b T s :ψ
,
b T s :ψ
b T ∗ (s, ψ)
b T ψ
,
a F s :ψ
a F ∗ (s, ψ) | a F ψ
,
b F s :ψ
b F ∗ (s, ψ) | b F ψ
The algorithm runs in two phases.
During the first phase, the algorithm will construct a tableau branch
using the tableau rules in a non-deterministic way. After all possible tableau
derivations have been applied, there are two possibilities for the constructed
branch. It can either be propositionally closed, that is, it could contain w T e
and w F e, or it can be complete, that is, the branch is not propositionally
closed and no application of a tableau rule gives a new prefixed formula. If it
is propositionally closed, the input is rejected, otherwise, the second phase of
the algorithm begins. Let Xa be the set of star expressions prefixed with a T
and Xb the set of star expressions prefixed with b T in the branch. Confirm
that no expression of the form ∗(t, φ) that appears negatively in the branch
for world prefix w can be derived from Xw. If this is indeed the case, the
algorithm accepts, otherwise, it rejects.
The proof of the correctness of the algorithm follows.
Proof. Supposing formula φ is satisfiable byM = ({a, b}, {(a, b), (b, b)}, V,A)
such as the ones described above and starting the procedure with a T φ, it is
easy to see that there is a way to perform the tableau rules while producing
a-prefixed expressions satisfied at world a and b-prefixed expressions satisfied
at world b. Now, if Xw derives ∗(t, ψ), then the minimal evidence function
that includes Xw should also include (t, ψ) (by Theorem 2), and therefore so
should A in the corresponding world. Therefore, no such negative expression
will be derivable by Xw. In conclusion, the algorithm accepts.
On the other hand, suppose the algorithm accepts. Suppose a complete
branch of the tableau that is produced in an accepting branch of the com-
putation tree. A model will be constructed to satisfy φ. This will be
M = ({a, b}, {(a, b), (b, b)}, V,A). V (p) will include a iff a T p appears in
the tableau and similarly for b. A on a will be the minimal evidence function
that includes (t, ψ) iff a T ∗ (t, ψ) appears in the tableau and again, similarly
for b. Since by the tableau rules, Xa ⊆ Xb, monotonicity is satisfied. If A so
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defined includes any negative ∗-expression in any of the two worlds, the sec-
ond step of the algorithm would have rejected the input and the computation
branch would not be accepting (again, by Theorem 2).
The model satisfies at a all a-prefixed expressions and at world b all b-
prefixed expressions. This can be proven by induction on the structure of the
expressions. By the above argument, this is automatically true for starred
expressions. Also, by definition of V , this is true for propositional variables.
Propositional cases are easy, so it remains to show this for formulas of the
form t :ψ.
First, for b-prefixed formulas. If b T t :ψ is in the branch, there must also
be b T ∗ (t, ψ) and b T ψ. By I.H., these are already satisfied, so b ∈ A(t, ψ)
and M, b |= ψ. Therefore, M, b |= t : ψ. If b F t : ψ is in the branch, then
the branch must also include either b F ψ or b F ∗ (t, ψ). In either case, the
conclusion is M, b 6|= t :ψ.
Finally, the case of a-prefixed formulas. If a T t :ψ is in the branch, there
must also be a T ∗ (t, ψ) and b T ψ (and b T t :ψ too, but it is not relevant
here). By I.H., these are already satisfied, so a ∈ A(t, ψ) and M, b |= ψ.
Therefore, M, a |= t :ψ. If a F t :ψ is in the branch, then the branch must
also include either b F ψ or a F ∗ (t, ψ). In either case, the conclusion is
M, b 6|= t :ψ.
This completes the correctness proof of the algorithm.
The first phase of the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial time,
while the second checks a condition known to be in coNP (Theorem 3).
Therefore, the algorithm establishes that JD4-satisfiability is in Σp2. The
following corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 6. JD4CS is in Π
p
2
for any axiomatically appropriate, schematic,
and efficiently decidable CS.
The following has been recently proven in [6].
Theorem 7 ([6]). JD4CS is Π
p
2
-hard, for any axiomatically appropriate, and
schematically injective CS.
Finally, combining these two results, we can claim the following.
Corollary 8. JD4CS is Π
p
2
-complete, for any axiomatically appropriate, schemat-
ically injective, and efficiently decidable CS.
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